Hapla's book carefully explains that the popular understanding of utilitarianism is just a poor caricature of true utilitarianism. He then explains that utilitarianism is not contrary to human rights. Finally, he also explains that the utilitarian justification of human rights has distinct advantages over the justifications provided by competing ethical theories. In effect, this means that Hapla's project is justificatory with respect to utilitarianism itself. On the one hand, it rehabilitates utilitarian moral thinking as such. On the other hand, it recommends utilitarian ethics because it supposedly provides a better justification for human rights than competing theories. Thus, Hapla explains that human rights are best combined with utilitarianism (the explanatory project). And he does it in favor of the acceptance of utilitarianism (the justification of utilitarianism).

I formulated my reconstruction of Hapla's methodology in three theses: (A1) The straw man thesis: The criticism that utilitarian conclusions contradict moral intuitions, or human rights, is grounded in the false assumption that utilitarianism ignores morally relevant facts, especially about human nature. (A2) The translation thesis: The criticism that utilitarianism ignores morally significant values overlooks the fact that utilitarianism reflects these values in terms of empirical facts. (A3) The empirical explanation thesis: Utilitarianism seeks to minimize normative and/or value ideology and maximize the work with empirical facts. This analysis of the facts, when done correctly, can ultimately explain why we prefer a particular ideology in the first place.

The purpose of my new text is to argue for three additional theses: (B1) The defensive analogy thesis: Rational egoism uses defensive arguments against its critics that are analogous to utilitarian defensive arguments. (B2) The empirical reflection thesis: The criticism that rational egoism ignores the value of equality overlooks the fact that rational egoism reflects this value in terms of empirical facts. (B3) The thesis of normative minimalism: Rational egoism satisfies the requirement for normative minimalism even better than utilitarian ethics. At first glance, it is clear that the three new theses are linked to the three original theses. However, there is an important difference. The original theses were formulated in favor of utilitarian ethics, while the new theses are formulated in favor of rational egoism. The point is that rational egoism can be defended in the similar way that Hapla defends utilitarianism. And perhaps even better. Personally, I do not subscribe to egoism. I will only try to show that this normative theory, unpopular as it is, should not be ignored.

All three new theses have practical implications for Hapla's utilitarian project. Thesis (B1) implies: If Hapla accepts the utilitarian defensive strategy against critics of utilitarianism, he should not reject the analogous defensive strategy when it is employed by rational egoism. Thesis (B2) implies: If Hapla accepts how utilitarianism translates values into the empirical domain, he should not reject when rational egoism does the same (and even more consequently).

Thesis (B3) implies: If Hapla accepts utilitarianism because it is normatively parsimonious, a fortiori he should accept rational egoism because it is even more parsimonious. The combination of the three new theses leads to the question: If we accept Hapla's methodological starting point, should we prefer utilitarian ethics or rational egoism?

I will discuss the theses in reverse order, i.e. (B3)-(B2)-(B1).

1. Thesis of normative minimalism

Hapla's methodological motivation is partly reminiscent of so-called logical empiricism, which is historically associated especially with the Vienna Circle.See e.g. Karl Sigmund, Exact Thinking in Demented Times: The Vienna Circle and the Epic Quest for the Foundations of Science (Basic Books 2017).⁴⁾ Hapla has much more confidence in empirical knowledge than in normative and value knowledge. Empirical judgments are subject to methods of objective verification or falsification. At least in principle, in the case of disagreement, one can systematically examine who is wrong on a given empirical question. While we also provide some justification for our value and moral judgments, we ultimately ground our justifications in our personal intuitions, which can be controversial. Hapla, like the classical utilitarians, rejects the idea that moral thought is grounded in long lists of independent value or normative intuitions. Indeed, such an approach easily degenerates into epistemic subjectivism.It is one thing whether there are objective moral facts. The other is whether there are objective methods of knowledge of such facts. Compare e.g.: Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford 1999) ch. 8.⁵⁾ References to intuitions have some argumentative merit only when they are shared. But individuals often disagree about their value and moral intuitions.

Hapla subscribes to a hedonistic utilitarianism. He prefers hedonism as a theory of well-being, especially because it reduces value intuitions to a minimum. From the point of view of hedonism, we recognize only two values, pleasure and pain. The hedonist takes it as self-evident that pleasure is good and pain is bad. But even if we combine hedonism with consequentialism, we will have at least two competing theories on offer: rational egoism and utilitarian ethics. Both normative theories call for the action that has the best hedonistic outcome in the long run.This means the highest aggregate pleasure after subtracting the aggregate pain.⁶⁾ Their difference lies in which pleasures and pains are to be counted in the hedonistic calculus. Rational egoism demands that the agent count only his pleasures and only his pains. Utilitarian ethics requires the agent to count the pleasures and pains of all beings who can experience these mental states.In the literature we sometimes encounter the following distinction: Egoism is individualistic hedonism, while utilitarianism is universalistic hedonism. See e.g. Fred Feldman, Introductory Ethics (Englewood Cliffs 1979) p. 82.⁷⁾ Utilitarians are proceeding from the so-called neutrality principle: Every pleasure and every pain should be counted as equally valuable, regardless of the bearer. And this normative principle makes the difference between the two theories.

Importantly, the rational egoist rejects the principle of neutrality as an independent normative principle. Hedonism as such does not imply that we should count every pleasure and every pain as equally valuable, regardless of the bearer. Pleasure and pain are mental states. Everyone experiences only his or her own mental states.Pleasure and pain can be understood as physiological ("natural") states of the brain, but at the cost that it is no longer intuitively self-evident that pleasure is good and pain is bad.⁸⁾ Everyone experiences only his or her own pleasure and his or her own pain. The individual takes it intuitively for granted that pleasure is good and pain is bad because he or she immediately experiences his or her pleasure as good and his or her pain as bad. Pleasure in itself is good only for the one who experiences it. And pain is bad in itself only for the one who experiences it. It is true that people can be empathetic. But empathy gives only instrumental value to other people's feelings. When I am empathetic to the feelings of others, someone else's pleasure is good for me only because it causes my pleasure. And someone else's pain is bad for me only because it causes my pain. Hedonism as such does not imply the principle of neutrality. When utilitarians accept the principle of neutrality, they add something extra normative to hedonism. Rational egoism seems to be a more normatively parsimonious theory than utilitarian ethics.Derek Parfit points out that rational egoism is not normatively the simplest theory. A theory that demands that an agent maximize only his or her present utility is even simpler. See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press 1984) ch. 45.⁹⁾ Not to mention that the principle of neutrality is not self-evident. Pleasure is good because I experience it as good. Pain is bad because I experience it as bad. It is certainly not self-evident that I should give the pleasures and pains I do not experience the same weight as the pleasures and pains I do experience. Normative theories should recognize the empirical fact that individuals are separate persons with respect to their mental states."It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently 'I' am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals." See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Macmillan 1907) p. 498.¹⁰⁾

Rational egoism is often objected to as being arbitrary: „Suppose I claim that I ought to maximize the welfare of blue-eyed people, but not of other people. Unless I can explain why blue-eyed people are to be preferred, my claim looks arbitrary, in the sense that I have given no reason for the different treatments. As a rational egoist, I claim that I ought to maximize the welfare of one person (myself). Unless I can explain why I should be preferred, my claim looks equally arbitrary.”Robert Shaver, ‘Egoism’ (First published Nov 4, 2002; Substantive revision Jan 9, 2023), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egoism/.¹¹⁾ We are considering a hedonistic version of rational egoism, and so the answer to this objection is easy. As a rational egoist, I claim that I should maximize my pleasure and minimize my pain because I experience only my pleasure as good and only my pain as bad. Other people's pleasure or pain has at most an instrumental value for me, because they are not my mental states. The arbitrariness objection wrongly assumes that the neutrality principle is a hedonistic default. Utilitarian ethics, compared to rational egoism, includes this extra principle. Utilitarians accept it as a normative axiom of their ethical thought. But this means that rational egoism fits Hapla's demand for normative minimalism even better than utilitarian ethics. So the normative minimalism thesis (B3) is true.

2. The empirical reflection thesis

It seems that a distinctive feature and advantage of utilitarianism is its normative minimalism. At the fundamental level, it makes do with only one moral norm of action: the so-called principle of utility. If the utilitarian uses any other moral norms, their correctness is derived from the principle of utility. Another advantage of utilitarianism is its analytical clarity: „Assuming a clear understanding of the crucial notions of alternative actions, outcomes, value, and well-being, utilitarianism is a precise moral theory which, given appropriate empirical information, has clear implications for all moral choice situations.”Krister Bykvist, Utilitarianism: a guide for the perplexed (Continuum 2010) p. 22.¹²⁾ The centrepiece of the utilitarian's work is the discovery of empirical information relevant to the utilitarian's evaluation. Utilitarians usually dislike artificial hypothetical examples that abstract from situational contexts, because utilitarian evaluation is sensitive to empirical input. The typical utilitarian response to such examples is to request the addition of relevant information. If one side of the utilitarian coin is normative minimalism, then the other side is empirical inclusiveness. The better informed we are, the better we can estimate and weigh the consequences of our actions.

In my first text I illustrated this fact on the topic of legal certainty. I compared human rights and utilitarian thinking. A human rights theorist will argue, for example, that legal certainty is an important value because it embodies respect for the human capacity to plan and organize one's future. This means respect for the individual's capacity to be an autonomous agent and, consequently, for his or her human dignity.See e.g. Lon Luvois Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) p. 162; Isabel Lifante-Vidal, ‘Is legal certainty a formal value?’ (2020) 11 (3) Jurisprudence 456, p. 459¹³⁾ The utilitarian will argue that a law that is blind to the rational capacities of its addressees cannot function as an efficient system for maximizing total utility. Unpredictable law erodes expectations, people lose trust in the system, and they also lose the incentive to try, plan, and invest. The utilitarian will argue that a law that is blind to the rational capacities of its addressees cannot function as an efficient system for maximizing general utility. Unpredictable law frustrates expectations, people lose trust in the system, and they also lose their motivation to try, plan, and invest. Life turns into mere survival, society does not prosper, the overall benefit is not what it could have been. The utilitarian thus understands the rational agency of individuals not as an intrinsic value, but as an empirical fact that is morally relevant because it is an important factor in maximizing general utility. The moral significance of legal certainty can be explained by a human rights value (human dignity) or a corresponding empirical fact (people have the ability to plan and organize their own future) in combination with the principle of utility. The criticism that utilitarianism ignores morally significant values overlooks the fact that utilitarianism reflects these values in terms of empirical facts. Moral significance is given to them by the principle of utility.

Now let us similarly compare utilitarianism with rational egoism. As mentioned above, these two theories differ in their conception of the principle of utility. Rational egoism demands that the agent count only his pleasure and only his pain. Utilitarians proceed from the principle of neutrality: We should count every pleasure and every pain as of equal worth, regardless of the bearer. So the principle of neutrality is an egalitarian principle. Utilitarian ethics demands that the agent take into account the pleasure and pain of all beings who can experience these mental states. The utilitarian accepts the principle of neutrality, so he or she assumes a priori that equality is an intrinsic value. This is the unjustified (axiomatic) starting point of his or her ethical theory.

The rational egoist has good reason to recognize the value of legal certainty because legal certainty allows him to develop and exercise his or her capacity to plan and invest. But that is not all. It is useful for the egoist that these guarantees also benefit others, because it is advantageous for him to live in a society of effective cooperation. The rational egoist personally benefits from living in a prosperous society and therefore has good reason to support the general institutional mechanisms that enable social prosperity. The egoist does not recognize equality as an intrinsic value, but this does not mean that he or she is indifferent to the value of equality. He or she has good reason to recognize equality with respect to guarantees of legal certainty because this system is beneficial to him or her in the long run. This means that rational egoism goes one step further than utilitarianism. It reflects in terms of empirical facts not only the value of legal certainty, but also the value of equality. The egoist is ready to recognize equality as an instrumental value when he or she assesses, on the basis of empirical facts, that a regime of equality pays off for him or her. We now come to (B2). The thesis of empirical reflection: the criticism that rational egoism ignores the value of equality overlooks the fact that rational egoism reflects this value in terms of empirical facts.

The utilitarian can point out that there is a significant difference between his or her approach and the egoistic approach to the value of equality. The utilitarian recognizes equality already at the fundamental level of the hedonic calculus and does so unconditionally. The principle of neutrality is the egalitarian foundation of utilitarian thinking. The rational egoist recognizes equality only when he or she assesses that it is profitable for him or her. He or she can do it at the fundamental level of the hedonic calculus or at the level of social institutions.When a rational egoist recognizes equality already at the level of the hedonic calculus, it means that he or she accepts the principle of neutrality for prudential reasons.¹⁴⁾ The utilitarian can criticize the egoist's instrumental approach to the value of equality. Whenever the egoist assesses, in the light of empirical facts, that inequality rather than equality is personally worthwhile for him or her, he or she willingly abandons the demand for equality. But such a critique doesn't sound very credible, since utilitarianism takes a similar instrumental approach to most values (including the value of equality when considered at other than a fundamental hedonic level). For the utilitarian, any value judgment that goes beyond mere hedonism and the principle of neutrality is conditioned in relation to maximizing general utility. This is a consequence of the methodological requirement to minimize value-normative inputs and maximize empirical inputs. The greater the proportion of the empirical component, the more contingent the evaluation. Rational egoism is continuous in its methodology with utilitarian ethics, but its approach is even more radical.

3. The defensive analogy thesis

In his book, Martin Hapla repeatedly emphasizes that the utilitarian goal is not to maximize utility within a local framework. He uses the so-called transplantation dilemma to illustrate this point. Five patients are dying in the hospital. Each of them urgently needs a different organ for transplant. A perfectly healthy person who would be a suitable donor has just fallen asleep in the waiting room. The critic argues that the utilitarian right course of action is to kill this man and save the five patients in question with the help of his organs. Subsequently, he claims that this utilitarian conclusion is contrary to moral intuitions. It also contradicts the human right to life. Hapla responds that this conclusion is in fact not even correct from the point of view of utilitarian ethics, because it does not take into account all the consequences that can be expected in the future. In particular, the erosion of trust in a health care system that would allow such a practice. Who would go to a hospital where they were at risk of such sacrifice for the benefit of someone else?Hapla (n 1) p. 41.¹⁵⁾

In the context of consequentialist reasoning, Hapla's strategy of defense is classic. It consists in revealing, after careful consideration of all the long-term effects of the alleged utilitarianism demand, that it is not in fact a utilitarian demand. The critique of utilitarianism is then dismissed as a textbook example of the straw man fallacy. Hapla's project assumes that utilitarianism provides the same, or at least very similar, results as human rights theory. This assumption cannot be proved in general. However, Hapla has repeatedly confirmed its plausibility by successfully employing the classic defensive strategy. Why is it so successful? Because critics of utilitarianism repeatedly forget that the demands of utilitarianism are not based only on local utility maximization, but on an overall consideration of all long-term effects. This means that we have to take into account a lot of empirical facts. Of course, it is not impossible that critics of utilitarianism will present some example of a true claim of utilitarianism that is contrary to the best ethical theory of human rights, so that the classical defense strategy fails. But so far it seems to be working pretty reliably.

A critic can argue that utilitarianism takes an instrumental approach to human rights and therefore cannot guarantee their unconditional validity. When, all things considered, we conclude that human rights enforcement is not the best way to maximize general utility in the long run, we have a good utilitarian reason to abandon human rights. This objection is well founded. But the utilitarian will reply that the moral validity of human rights is not dogma. Human rights are not to be revered as something sacred. Human rights are not intrinsic values. They are valuable because they are socially useful. It is not rational to stubbornly support certain social institutions when we have available alternative institutions that are more socially useful.

We will now show that rational egoism has arguments against its critics that are analogous to the defensive argumentative strategy of utilitarianism. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: „A man is the treasurer of a large pension fund. He is entrusted with the job of keeping track of and investing the money deposited by the workers. When a worker retires, the worker is entitled to draw a weekly sum from the fund. Suppose the treasurer discovers that it will be possible for him to use all the money for his own selfish pleasure without being caught. Perhaps he wants to buy a large yacht and sail to a South Sea island, there to live out his days in idleness, indulgence, procreation, and, in a word, enjoyment. Since there is no extradition treaty between the South Sea island and the United States, he can get away with it. Let us also suppose that if the treasurer does abscond with the funds, hundreds of old people will be deprived of their pensions. They will be heartbroken to discover that instead of living comfortably on the money they had put into the pension fund, they will have to suffer the pain and indignity of poverty.”Feldman (n 7) p. 95.¹⁶⁾

A critic of egoism will argue that stealing money from the pension fund is an egoistically right but immoral action. It is an immoral action because it abuses the trust of the workers and causes them harm. But it is egoistically right for the treasurer because it pays off for him. However, a rational egoist can employ the classic defense strategy. He will argue that all things considered, we conclude that such an action is not right even from the point of view of rational egoism: „One way of establishing this claim is to show that agent utility has been improperly calculated. For example, even though there is (ex hypothesi ) no extradition treaty between the South Sea island and the United States, the treasurer isn’t safe until he arrives on the island. There is always a nonzero probability that he will be apprehended before he leaves the jurisdiction of the United States, in which case he will (or may) be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished (possibly severely). There is also a nonzero probability that family and friends of the victimized pensioners will track the treasurer down and return him to the United States (or worse, torture and kill him). There is also a nonzero probability that, when word gets out among the islanders about what the new resident did to become wealthy, they will take the law into their own hands and “punish” him (perhaps hoping, thereby, to appease the United States). When these probabilities (and others) are taken into account, the egoist says, the act of stealing the money no longer maximizes agent utility; and if it no longer maximizes agent utility, then it is not right, according to egoism.”Keith Burgess-Jackson, ‘How to Defend a Normative Ethical Theory’ (2021) 11 (2) Open Journal of Philosophy 229, p. 239. ¹⁷⁾ A utilitarian may argue that rational egoism can somehow justify why it is wrong for the treasurer to steal money from the pension fund, but it uses the wrong reasons. Stealing money is wrong not primarily because it does not maximize the treasurer's personal utility, but because it does not maximize the general utility.A non-utilitarian might formulate the objection as follows: Stealing money is wrong not primarily because it does not maximize the treasurer's personal utility, but because it harms the workers.¹⁸⁾ But an analogous objection can be used against the utilitarian: Sacrificing an individual's life to save five other people is wrong not primarily because it does not maximize general utility, but because it causes harm to the person sacrificed.

Now we can formulate (B1). The defensive analogy thesis: Rational egoism uses defensive arguments against its critics that are analogous to utilitarian defensive arguments. Consequently, egoism is also subject to analogous counterarguments. If Hapla accepts a utilitarian defensive strategy against critics of utilitarianism, he should not reject an analogous defensive strategy when employed by rational egoism.Burgess-Jackson rightly demands that we give the egoist the same leeway to use the classical defense strategy that we grant the utilitarian. See Keith Burgess-Jackson, ‘Taking Egoism Seriously’ (2013) 16 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 529, p. 532.¹⁹⁾ Rational egoism is a structurally similar normative theory to utilitarian ethics, so it should come as no surprise that it uses similar argumentative moves. Sophisticated versions of utilitarianism and rational egoism are also likely to converge on similar conclusions about the rightness of action. Therefore, Hapla should justify why he prefers utilitarian game over egoistic game.

Conclusion

Martin Hapla evaluates ethical theories according to meta-theoretical criteria. He prefers simple, clear, transparent and parsimonious theories. He wants to minimize the value-normative component and maximize the empirical component of moral thinking. He concluded that these criteria are best met by utilitarian ethics. The difficulty is that the same criteria are even better met by rational egoism. Hapla may argue that rational egoism per se is not an ethical theory."Rational egoism claims that an act is rational if, only if, and because it has at least as much expected benefit for the agent as any alternative act. Rational egoism is not a theory about what is ethical." Viz Brad Hooker, ‘Egoism, Partiality and Impartiality’ In Roger Crisp (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 716.²⁰⁾ I don't think it matters whether rational egoism per se is an ethical theory. More importantly, it is a normative theory that has a potential to justify moral obligations as well as human rights. In light of egoism, it can be justified that it is rational to take on such commitments. In this sense, it is a competing theory to utilitarian ethics.If Hapla believes it matters, the discussion can be reoriented from rational egoism to ethical egoism. In my view, however, ethical egoism is a dubious normative position. Either it collapses into rational egoism, or it is difficult to explain what its ethical nature consists in.²¹⁾ If Hapla wants to insist on utilitarianism, he must explain why utilitarianism is a better theory of right action and justification of human rights than rational egoism. But this is not an easy task. Indeed, even the brilliant Henry Sidgwick in his heroic The Methods of Ethics (1874) did not manage it. I confess to gloating over this. Hapla delights in frustrating his critics by easily deflecting their classic objections to utilitarianism with an equally classic strategy of defense.Jiří Baroš, ‘Proč nejsem utilitaristou? Vyznání přirozenoprávníka’ (2023) 11 Právník 1047; Martin Abel, ‘Utilitaristická justifikace lidských práv: čtyři argumenty’ (2023) 11 Právník 1062; Martin Turčan, ‘Utilitarizmus, ľudské práva a naše morálne intuície’ (2023) 11 Právník 1067; Martin Hapla, ‘Proč být utilitaristou? O smyslu a zdůvodnění lidských práv’ (2023) 11 Právník 1080.²²⁾ It is a predictable game. I imagine he would be frustrated by a rational egotist in a similar vein. Martin would present him with hypothetical examples to illustrate that egoism is contrary to moral common sense. An egoist would smilingly retort that he has not considered all the relevant empirical facts.

More positively: Don't be afraid of egoism. If we can justify human rights in terms of rational egoism, this means that human rights are burdened with minimal value-normative assumptions. If this is the case, this is good news.