The first chapter deals with defining the object of the study. It gives its readers an overview of the discourse which is going to be explored. This monograph characterizes the fragmentation of law as a situation where the growing complexity of social arrangements and, in turn, also of the legal regulations weakens the links among the individual legal institutions, branches of law, and sources of law.Pavel Ondřejek. Defragmentation of law: reconstruction of contemporary law as a system. Intersentia, 2023, p. 5.¹⁾

According to the author, there are two main sources of fragmentation within international law which also directly influence the national law:

1.     The growing complexity and comprehensiveness of statutory regulation and the emphasis on specialization within the legal system.

2.     Having an overlap between national and international judicial institutions and potential clashes between national and international laws.

This definition and the causes are indeed acceptable and supported by a plethora of quality international sources. It is questionable though, whether the following hypotheses could be applicable universally to the fragmentation of national legal systems as Ondřejek suggests.Ibid., p. 13, 15.²⁾

Is the growing complexity of the law truly a problem?

The author contributes the first cause of fragmentation to the increasing complexity of social relations within the society. He argues that this, in turn, creates the need for the onslaught of statutory novelizations, and as a byproduct, the law becomes needlessly specialized. Ondřejek supports this by using the statistical analysis of Cvrček.Ibid., p. 22.³⁾ It should be pointed out, that even though Cvrček uses robust datasets and computation to analyze his data, Ondřejek doesn’t give a second thought to its further interpretation and the limits, which is a little bit of a shame, considering this data is the fundamental cornerstone of the argument. Cvrček himself has had quite a negative outlook on the pace of novelizations in the recent past, consistently criticizing it in his works.František Cvrček. Právní informatika a lingvistika [Legal Informatics and Linguistics]. Jurisprudence, 25(6), 2016, p. 49.; František Cvrček. Základní kvantitativní parametry českého právního řádu [Quantitative parametrization of the legal system]. Právník, 145(4), 2006, p. 434. A counterargument to this would be that the numerous novelizations are simply necessary to help regulate the increasing pace of technological and societal advances and there is no other adequate instrument to do so.⁴⁾

According to the hypothesis above, the body of law, in general, has been getting more complex and thus fragmented. Logically, this should result in an average citizen, having an inadequate understanding of the regulations. That could very well translate into a lesser ability to deal with legal problems by himself.

In relation to that, Cvrček mentions the lack of sociological research on whether the hypertrophy of the law is an issue, as a clear limiting factor.Cvrček, Základní kvantitativní parametry českého právního řádu (n. 4), p. 434.⁵⁾ Another limitation of Cvrček’s research is the fact that we don’t know whether the growing complexity of the law truly translates into inadequate legal literacy and ability to solve legal problems in an average citizen. For that matter, there are some studies worth exploring that can partially clarify that. However, their numbers are limited and were conducted at different time periods.Jan Pokorný. Zbývá v době fragmentace a pluralismu nějaké místo na dobro? [In an age of fragmentation and pluralism, is there any room left for good in the law?] In: Marta Tothová, Dominik Šoltys (eds). Právo a ideál dobra a spravodlivosti: Pocta Pavlovi Holländerovi k 70. narodeninám [Law and Ideals of Goodness and Justice: A Tribute to 70th Birthday of Pavel Holländer]. Univerzita Pavla Josefa Šafaříka, Právnická fakulta, 2023, p. 305–309.⁶⁾

The EU citizens´ low levels of legal literacy hypotheses are supported by a few statistical surveys, even though they are very few far and between. According to the 2013 Flash Eurobarometer, approx. 50-60% of aggregated EU citizens feel “not very well informed: or “not informed at all”.Directorate-General for Communication. Flash Eurobarometer 385: Justice in the EU (2015) Questions 2.1-2.5 in dataset A. In: https://data.europa.eu/data/datasets/s1104_385?locale=en, accessed 23 November 2023. ⁷⁾ That is in line with OECD’s findings.OECD/Open Society Foundations. Legal Needs Surveys and Access to Justice. Paris, OECD Publishing, 2019. In: https://doi.org/10.1787/g2g9a36c-en, accessed 23 November 2023.⁸⁾ In the matter of legal emancipation, the situation is different.Legal literacy is tied to the knowledge of the law, while legal emancipation represents the ability to understand and apply the law.⁹⁾ Although doctrinal research tends to lead to sceptical conclusions because it ties legal emancipation directly to the low average values of legal literacy, questionnaire research in Europe has yielded rather contradictory findings.

 In particular, we can examine some of the available statistics in detail.  In the study How People Understand and Interact with the Law, the researchers examined the legal literacy and emancipation of citizens in England and Wales and found a relatively positive coefficient of confidence in the fair resolution of legal problems in multiple areas. This suggests that the average person would feel slightly positive about resolving a legal problem if it was something important to deal with.Pascoe Pleasence, Nigel Balmer and Catrina J Denvir. How people understand and interact with the law. PPSR, 2015, p. 123. In: https://www.thelegaleducationfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/HPUIL_report.pdf, accessed 23 November 2023.¹⁰⁾ At the same time, it can be said that in the area of consumer disputes, a substantial portion of respondents (approximately 60%) report fairly good knowledge and abilities to resolve these matters and satisfaction with the outcomes of their resolutions in the past.Ibid., p. 162.¹¹⁾ Corresponding data emerge in the survey on the population of the European Union Les citoyens et l’accès à la justice.Rosario Spadaro. Eurobaromèttre special 195/vague 60.0. Les Citoyens de L’union Européenne Et L’accès à La Justice [Special Eurobarometr. The Citizens of the European Union and the Access to Justice]. The european opinion research group, 2004, p. 8–26. In: https://docplayer.fr/176396513-Les-citoyens-de-l-union-europeene-et-l-acces-a-la-justice.html, accessed 23 November 2023.¹²⁾

Pleasence et al. also found that technological advances can significantly improve the legal emancipation of the inhabitants. The respondents who researched their problems using standard internet services such as Google had a much higher chance of resolving them successfully.Pleasence, Balmer and Denvir (n. 10), p. 133–159.¹³⁾ It is an open-ended question whether this trend will further increase with the emergence and rising proficiency of A.I. engines, such as the ChatGPT. Considering that legal A.I. engines are being developed at this moment, they could potentially give the citizens better tools to research and deal with their legal problems. Here, it is, however, necessary to mention that there are notable limitations within the research design of the conducted studies, which the authors themselves acknowledge. Even though the statistical numbers support the hypothesis that internet access improves the ability to solve legal problems, there is a bias as lower-income class inhabitants may not have any or limited access to internet services. The respondents who were able to use the internet to consult their issues probably belonged to the middle or higher income class, who then had different education and lifestyle which disrupts the questionnaire’s sampling.

These surveys’ findings cannot be generalized globally and directly apply only to certain territories and kinds of problems. Nevertheless, it sufficiently illustrates that even though the complexity of the legal norms has been increasing, the citizens are quite capable of solving legal problems with or without additional help. The survey from the United Kingdom (UK) illustrates this in a detailed fashion by studying numerous contexts and situations. In the EU the data is sourced narrowly, mostly in relation to consumer issues, but generally, it can be said that it follows similar trends and is roughly similar.

Now, looking at the hypotheses about the fragmentation of law from this point of view, it is possible to argue that even though the number of legal norms and the complexity of the legal system is increasing, it may not have any meaningful impact on the ability of the regular citizen to solve legal problems. After all, it is one of the basic legal principles that the laws should reflect the natural behaviour of people so that they don’t need to study it in order to function in the everyday world. The laws should be there only to prevent or solve conflicts.

Is the law getting fragmented equally among jurisdictions?

Further observing Ondřejek’s definition of fragmentation and its causes, as well as the ensuing discussion, it can be argued that they are formulated too broadly. While reading between the lines, it is apparent, that these statements are meant to be applicable in general.Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 13–15.¹⁴⁾ It is necessary to point out that these hypotheses should apply predominantly to specific states of the continental legal culture. More precisely the central European countries. It is largely up to the specific conditions in each state as to how extensively its law might be fragmented and what the parameters of this individual fragmentation could be.  There are several reasons for this.

First off, the extensiveness of national law fragmentation is indirectly dependent on the variable of the sheer economic and military power of the given state. The stronger states have more say in the creation and application of international regulations. That stems simply from the fact that they have stronger representation in international organizations that contribute to the body of international law as well as the organs that are responsible for its application. An example of this can be the European Parliament, where the number of seats corresponding to each state is calculated by an algorithm primarily based on its population.For the overview of historical and contemporary calculations see: Linda L. Fowler, Pieter L. Polhuis and Scott C. Paine. Changing Patterns of Voting Strength in the European Parliament. Comparative politics, 15(2), 1983, p. 159.; Madeleine O Hosli. Voting strength in the European Parliament: The influence of national and of partisan actors. European Journal of Political Research, 31(3), 1997, p. 351.; Janusz Łyko and Ewa Łyko, The Composition of the European Parliament During the 2019–2024 Term in Light of Legal Provisions and the Rules of Fair Distribution. In: Bilgin Huseyin Mehmet, Danis Hakan and Demi Ender (eds). Eurasian Economic Perspectives: Proceedings of the 26^th and 27^th Eurasia Business and Economics Society Conferences, edited by Mehmet Huseyin Bilgin et al. Springer International Publishing AG, 2020, p. 363–374. ¹⁵⁾ The importance of power balance is especially apparent, with the UN’s Security Council’s permanent members who have the veto right. It effectively renders any UN enforcement measures useless if they displease any of the permanent members. On top of that, superpowers such as the United States of America (USA), the Russian Federation, and China are often found blatantly disregarding international laws and institutions as their position simply allows it.

In 2017, based on a thorough study of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decisions, Council of Europe documents, and interviews with Council of Europe staff, Trochev, and Roter concluded that Russian courts, and especially the state administration, violate fundamental human rights and freedoms depending on their particular political interests in a given case. According to them, the Russian Federation has a similar attitude toward respecting and enforcing the ECHR decisions.Alexei Trochev. The Russian Constitutional Court and the Strasbourg Court: Judicial Pragmatism in a Dual State. In: Lauri Mälksoo and Wolfgang Benedek (eds). Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect. Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 125–149.; Petra Roter. Russia in the Council of Europe: Participation à la carte. Russia and the European Court of Human Rights. In: Lauri Mälksoo and Wolfgang Benedek (eds). Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect. Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 26–56.¹⁶⁾

A similar thing can be said for the USA, deciding to adhere to international treaties concerning human rights depending on political whims and their military aims. That much is obvious if we look at the cases of the use of chemical weapons in the Vietnam War or the legality of the operation of the Guantanamo Bay facility.See Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing consent: the political economy of the mass media: with a new introduction by the authors. Pantheon Books, 2002, p. 31 of the introduction.¹⁷⁾

Simply put, the superpowers don’t adhere to the same rules as far as the European understanding of international law goes. They can freely limit the extent, to which their judicial institutions might be fragmented by simply not respecting international institutions’ decisions. In that case, the aforementioned hypotheses can be applied to these states only in a limited capacity and thus cannot be used universally.

The notion of legal pluralism and its theoretical character

In chapter 4, this monograph provides a very nice comprehensive overview of the main doctrinal theories concerning legal pluralism. From the get-go, it is apparent that the author’s outlook on the systemic nature of law is heavily inspired by Luhman.Niklas Luhman. The Unity of The Legal System. In: Gunther Teubner (ed). Autopoietic Law a New Approach to Law and Society. Reprint, W. de Gruyter, 2011, p. 12–36.¹⁸⁾ In his previous work, he describes the body of law as a relatively autonomous legal system, which interacts with other systems within the society.Pavel Ondřejek. Koncepce práva jako systému [A Conception of Law as a System]. Wolters Kluwer, 2020.¹⁹⁾ This theme continues throughout this monograph as he very diligently separates law and legal institutes from social systems and influences. The same is apparent here as his view of legal pluralism is heavily based on the legal positivist outlook.

Ondřejek differs between two variants:

1.     The narrow conception of legal pluralism, where legal pluralism is understood as an overlap of official legal systems and judicial institutions.

2.     Normative pluralism, a situation where the state officially accepts or tolerates legal norms from non-state sources such as lex mercatoria, religious systems etc.Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 142.²⁰⁾

Ondřejek argues, that the narrow conception is based on legal positivist pluralism, while the second one belongs to the sociological category. Typically, these are the two widely recognized forms of legal pluralism. The positivist conception is traditionally accepted. Griffiths started the discussion in his works by calling it the weak form of legal pluralism. The positivist approach to legal pluralism is based on a concept constructed around the term “focal norm” or “grundnorm”. It is a narrower conception that understands legal pluralism as a state where in a certain territory or for a certain subject, multiple legal systems apply, each having its own normative focus.John Griffiths. What is legal pluralism? The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 18(24), 1986, p. 1, 7.; Ondřejek (n. 19), p. 194. ²¹⁾ Kysela as well as Ondřejek (in his previous works) prefer this conception.Jan Kysela. Měnící se struktura právního řádu a jeho atributy [The Changing Structure of Legal Order and Its Attributes]. Eric Stein Working Paper, 1/2009, p. 3–6.; Ondřejek (n. 19), p. 194. ²²⁾ As Ondřejek rightly points out, Benda-Beckmann and Turner, as well as Berman, among others, also recognize this.Keebet Benda-Beckmann and Bertram Turner. Legal pluralism, social theory, and the state. Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 50(3), 2018, p. 255, 263.; Paul Schiff Berman. Global legal pluralism: a jurisprudence of law beyond borders, Cambridge University Press, 2012.²³⁾

From a sociological point of view. It can be argued that both these types of legal pluralism should be subsumed under the positivist conception. Moreover, Ondřejek’s normative positivism does not fully reflect how non-state systems and the positive law interact. As one of the examples of normative pluralism, Ondřejek mentions the institution of the Muslim Arbitration tribunal.Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 142.²⁴⁾ Griffiths, however, does subsume the recognition of Islamic law under the weak, positivist conception of legal pluralism.Griffiths (n. 21), p. 1, 7.²⁵⁾ In that regard, if we stay faithful to Griffiths’ classification, we have to conclude that Ondřejek describes two slightly different variants of legal pluralism; both fundamentally based on legal positivist philosophy.

A second argument can be made from a doctrinal as well as a sociological point of view. A prevalent number of authors within the discourse work with the idea of sociological legal pluralism.Tamanaha gives a nice overview of the socio-legal scholars: Marc Galanter, Sally Frank Moore, Peter Fitzpatrick, Roger Cotterrell, Gunther Teubner, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Sally Engle Merry, Masaji Chiba. Brian Z. Tamanaha. A non-essentialist version of legal pluralism. Journal of Law and Society, 27(2), 2000, p. 296.²⁶⁾ It stems from Ehrlich´s conception of “living law”, where the legal norms are spontaneously created and followed by society.Eugen Ehrlich. Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law. L. M. Walter tr., Routledge, 2001. ²⁷⁾ Griffiths then built on this conception with the notion of strong legal pluralism. The kind of legal norms that are fully autonomous of the state and do not need any kind of acceptance or tolerance to be considered law.Griffiths (n. 21), p. 1, 7.²⁸⁾ This conception has been upheld by a multitude of authors including the ones that Ondřejek cites as the proponents of the narrower positivist legal pluralism.Benda-Beckmann, Turner (n. 23), p. 255, 263.; Berman (n. 24).²⁹⁾ It is peculiar, to say the least, that even though Ondřejek clearly concedes that “legal pluralism is an attribute of a social field and not of law”Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 147.³⁰⁾, he goes on to completely discard the truly sociological part of legal pluralism, which is the cornerstone of the traditional foundation of this conception.For a comprehensive analysis see Tamanaha (n. 26), p. 312–321.³¹⁾ Without it, the discourse simply becomes an exercise in conflict resolution between different official legal systems.

On the other hand, the author makes a compelling counterargument to this by mentioning lex mercatoria, lex digitalis, and the possibility of the use of religious law before arbitration tribunals among certain jurisdictions such as the UK.Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 143–144.³²⁾ These are relatively unofficial sources of the law, that can be used only in case the parties explicitly agree to it. The applicable content of these regulations and their use is strictly limited by the state’s public law. To their fullest extent, these quasi-codified norms and religious systems can only be used before an arbitration court. In that case, the parties are limited by the scope of possible situations they can bring before it.Compare for example: article 1, section 1 (b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 c. 23 (of England); section 2 (2) of the Act no. 216/1994 Coll., o rozhodčím řízení a o výkonu rozhodčích nálezů [arbitration act of the Czech Republic]; section 2060 of the Code Civil.³³⁾ If the necessary conditions are met though, then even some of the procedural norms of the said quasi-codified systems are applicable.Essentially, this is a broad statement and the exact framework of how the process before individual arbitration courts is regulated is a question of statutory regulation of each jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is still valid to say that in general the process is much more lenient and open to modifications by agreement of the parties involved. For more detail, compare Amanda M. A. Baker. Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious Arbitration. Vermont Law Review, 157(37), 2012, p. 157.; Kovacs v. Kovacs (1993). Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 98 Md. App. 289, 633 A.2d 425. ³⁴⁾ These are the cases when alternative dispute resolution deals with property rights, civil obligations, and to a limited extent family law disputes. Since the parties must agree on the source of law which shall govern their mutual obligations, it means, that applicability of these norms is a matter of contractual obligations rather than legal pluralism. This possibility also has to be explicitly allowed by the state law. That is obviously in stark contrast, with the sociological school of legal pluralism which considers certain non-state legal norms to be at the same level or even above the state’s public law depending on the circumstances.Boaventura S. Santos. Towards a New Legal Common Sense. 3rd edn, Cambridge University Press, 2020, p. 107–109.³⁵⁾

At this point, the discussion has to boil down to the omnipresent question: What is law?Santos, Tamanaha and Twining arrive at similar crossroads in the discourse at Santos (n. 35), p. 111–112.³⁶⁾ Ondřejek clearly follows Hart’s thought as he clearly requires the recognition by the state as one of the key components for any norm be pronounced a source of law.Massimo La Torre. The Hierarchical Model and H. L. A. Hart's Concept of Law. Les juristes et la hiérarchie des norms, 2013(21), p. 141.; Jiří Boguszak and Jiří Čapek and Aleš Gerloch. Teorie práva [Theory of law]. 2nd edn, ASPI, 2004, p. 81.; Pavel Maršálek. Právo a společnost [Law and Society]. Auditorium, 2008, p. 191.³⁷⁾ However, there is an interesting argument to be made. When the states weaken or just choose to look away, communities that essentially replace the failing state’s law and order may emerge.

Ondřejek cites the work of Tamanaha who includes quasi-legal and private law-making activities into legal pluralism.Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 125.³⁸⁾ Within this discourse, Santos refers to politically dynamic South American states that see frequent changes in governance. There, gangs or communities regularly maintain law and order by themselves.Santos (n. 35), p. 121–192.³⁹⁾ Berman mentions an example concerning such a situation in Kosovo, where the postwar cultural clashes between Serbian and Albanian communities had made it nearly impossible to draft legislation that would have been accepted by all the communities.Berman (n. 23), p. 42.; Rosa Brooks Ehrenreich. The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the "Rule of Law". Michigan Law Review, 101(7), 2003, p. 2275.⁴⁰⁾

Ondřejek must have foreseen the flow of the discourse for he promptly introduces Twining’s floodgates argument into the discussion with the comment, that “the sociological approach to legal pluralism lies in insufficient distinction of the law from other normative systems in society”Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 125.⁴¹⁾. It can be noted, that similarly, Tamanaha criticizes Santos for seeing the law virtually everywhere, even though his own views are heavily based on sociological approaches.Brian Z. Tamanaha. A general jurisprudence of law and society. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 182.⁴²⁾ Twining’s rationale is the following: A more traditional concern has been with a version of ‘the floodgates argument’. If one opens the door to some examples of non-state law, then we are left with no clear basis for differentiating legal norms from other social norms, legal institutions and practices from other social institutions and practices, legal traditions from religious or other general intellectual traditions and so on.William Twining. General jurisprudence: understanding law from a global perspective. Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 369.⁴³⁾

I propose that the answer to the floodgate’s argument is to use the Foucaultian view which means solving the problem by the facticity of brute force. Euphemistically, we could call it the authoritative use of violence by the one who possesses enforcement capabilities. Under this prism, the law could be defined as a binding set of rules, that can be consistently enforced by any social community occupying a certain territory.Anthony Beck. Foucault and Law: the Collapse of Law's Empire. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 16(3), 1996, p. 489.⁴⁴⁾ By this logic, we would then have to accept that law can be any well-formulated, widely known rule that is consistently enforced. In relation to the question of force and central authority, Rothberg makes quite an interesting point. He compares the behaviour of communities in failing states to the behaviour of countries in the system of international law. His findings clearly warn of serious security risks stemming from the lack of enforcement by a central entity.Nelson Kasfir. Two Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas, and Violent Predation: CAUSES OF FAILURE. In: Robert Rotberg (ed). When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 60–70.⁴⁵⁾ When there is no universal organ capable of attaining order, different groups and communities fight each other, create unions to bolster their strength and engage in political negotiations.  In a sense, we could draw a parallel to Thomas Hobbes’s natural state of mankind theory of war of all against all.Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Open Road Integrated Media, 2020, p. 79–80. ⁴⁶⁾

Legal pluralism as a source of integration in law

If we were to evaluate legal pluralism, based on the aforementioned sociological hypotheses, we would probably come to the conclusion, that it is a severely detrimental phenomenon to the unity of the law. The non-state quasi-legal norms may act as a destabilizing element to the principle of legal certainty and the security risks mentioned in Rothberg’s theories are certainly plausible. Ondřejek, however, creates an intriguing plot twist when he suggests that legal pluralism can be seen as a source of unity in law and makes well-structured arguments to support this hypothesis and, to an extent, counteract the prevailing doctrine of legal pluralism being a negative entity. His concept relies on higher courts and international courts gradually aligning their legal opinions, which in turn creates greater unity in the system of international law. He notes that it can also help protect individual rights on a national level.Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 12.⁴⁷⁾

The argument that legal pluralism can help create unity in law can be further strengthened by the fact that there has been an ongoing hybridization of legal cultures. The Anglo-Saxon legal system as a whole is poised to be affected by fragmentation to a much lesser extent thanks to the precedential character of their law. As we discussed above, the continental law’s frequent novelizations convoluting and burdening the body of law, are one of its core issues. Precedential law has much more of a dynamic character, being able to effectively react to technological and societal changes without being deformed by the onslaught of novelizations. Thanks to the hybridization, the new quasi-precedential character of decisions within the continental system has become the topic of interest as a potential remedy that could help further unify the law.

Methodology

The author chose a methodology that is customary for traditional legal scholars. It leans heavily on structural, and analytical approaches. A major part of the work is argued from the legal positivist perspective. That creates an interesting and unusual twist and possibly even tension in some chapters as the topics of fragmentation and legal pluralism have been originally researched from sociological and historical angles. The research is predominantly qualitative with the author choosing specific legal cases and historical events to demonstrate his arguments.

As far as the qualitative methods are concerned, the strong point of the book is certainly its comparative approach. The author fluently uses a comparative analysis of court cases and statutory regulations from numerous jurisdictions to synthesize the answers to his research questions.

The monograph contains a few empirical elements as it is possible to find references to topical, relevant statistics. They are used mostly as a supportive element to the complex doctrinal arguments, rather than being a significant point of analysis and argumentation.

Conclusion

With respect to the case studies Ondřejek provided on the integrative potential of legal pluralism, it is necessary to question the replicability of the highlighted processes. The significance of this research depends on whether these were just rare occurrences and statistical anomalies, or if there is truly causality.Ondřejek (n. 1), p. 129–135.⁴⁸⁾ Without a bulk of data that would reveal the tendencies of different courts and how inclined they are on average to be influenced by other courts’ decisions, we cannot say with any certainty that the suggested “avalanche effect” could be a realistic statistical possibility. On the other hand, there is a quality counterargument that needs to be mentioned. Because of how the process of adopting foreign high court decisions works in practice, it is acceptable to consider that a decision of excellent quality might at any time be just a few steps away from being widely adopted, inspiring other courts to follow its argumentation. This is with reference to the fact that a multitude of states simply choose to ignore international treaties and courts, as was discussed in the review of the introductory chapter, which causes a great deal of legal uncertainty.

That of course does not take anything away from the originality, this monograph brings with these two following aspects:

1.     The author uses a legal positivist approach to deal with a relatively legal-sociology-oriented discourse while respecting its sociological core. There certainly had been scholars that debated whether the nature of legal pluralism is a rather sociological or a positivist construct, but the discussion typically hadn’t offered much in terms of novelty. The authors picked their preferred interpretation of legal pluralism and interacted with the discourse in line with it. Then proceeded to disregard the parts that would not fit their view. The fact, that Ondřejek respects the core sociological foundation of legal pluralism but applies a positivist approach to its study creates a new and unusual take that nudges the discussion forward and offers new, refreshing perspectives.

2.     The argument that legal pluralism is not just an erosive, degrading element and a danger to any stable legal order, but also a source of integrative potential. An impulse that may overall improve the substantive and procedural standards of human rights among European jurisdictions.

Overall, this work provides its readers with a great number of international academic sources that have been frequently cited in the latest publications and deals very well with the challenging topic of fragmentation of law in a logical and meaningful way. Without any doubt, it provides new, refreshing views on discussed matters and is a must-read for any scholar interested in the fragmentation of national law.

This article was created as a part of the fulfillment of the Specific research project for students of Charles University (SVV) No. 260 622 "Technological Progress and Societal Transformations of Law as Challenges for Exploring Fundamental Legal Questions".